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3 PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
The  aim of this Information Report  is to analyse the demographic situation in  the European 
Community - as characterised by the changing profile of the age pyramid - identify the causes 
of it, assess the consequences and suggest remedies. 
Demographers work on the long term. Their reference is the duration of a human life. From birth, 
and for more than three quarters of a century, a child is a component of the age pyramid - for 
much longer if one accepts that people will continue to live longer. 
Demographers  are  therefore  a  cautious  race,  especially  in  their  predictions  and  in  the 
consequences they foreshadow, which may be influenced by technological, economic, social and 
political factors that are difficult to predict with accuracy, both as  regards the time of their 
appearance and their effects. 
For instance, statistical forecasts like those in Table 17 announcing a very steep and rapid increase 
in the population of certain parts of the world must be seen in conjunction with such things as 
the physical ability of these regions to cope with a population boom. But one must take trends 
into account, especially as regards overall quantitative differences and their distribution among 
the major age groups. 
The food resources of countries which experience a steep and rapid population increase are often 
so scant, and their poverty so great, that they could slide into a state of endemic famine which 
could lead to the death of entire communities. Such momentous, and very tangible, possibilities 
are a challenge to the developed countries. They should lead to a rethink of certain individual 
and collective attitudes, with the aim of sharing out the resources needed for life in a truly fair way. 
Demographers reason on  the basis of trends. They select hypotheses. They think through the 
consequences. They warn. They alert people. Demographic facts and hypotheses are important 
factors when political, economic and social decisions have to be taken by the powers-that-be. 
Such  factors can  no  longer be  ignored; if they are,  the human dimension of decision-making 
becomes truncated. But demographers do not merely quantify the overall population; they also 
consider its structure and,  in  doing so,  its quality. 
Since 1964, the birth rate in each of the countries which now make up the EEC has been falling 
constantly. After 1975, there were some very slight improvements here and there. However, there 
is nothing to indicate when, or even  if, we  shall regain the average of 2.1  children per woman 
which is needed  merely to keep the population stable. 
Ireland still has a fertility rate of more than 2.1  children. But it is experiencing a fairly big drop 
in its birth rate; the fertility rate has fallen from 4.07 children per woman in 1964 to 2.95 in 1982. 
If a country's fertility rate is nearer the threshold of replacement to start with, the situation is 
even  more serious. 
This situation is not peculiar to Europe. The birth rate in the USA started to fall in 1960. After 
reaching  Europe,  lower birth rates started to occur first in  Japan, and  then  in  Australia. The 
phenomenon therefore affects all the developed countries, and has no historical precedent. 
This  Information Report  is essentially concerned with population issues. 
It fits in  perfectly with the nature and aims of the Economic and Social Committee's work. It 
respects the spirit of tolerance which characterises the Committee's debates. Thus this Report 
cannot pass over the human and cultural factors raised by demographic data. 
In accordance with the spirit and letter of previous Committee Opinions, the Section for Social 
Questions affirms the obligation incumbent upon the Member States, when implementing their 
policies, to respect the consciences of couples and women, who alone should have the right to 
choose freely whether or not to have children. This is a basic democratic right of the individual 
and  the family. 
4 A child is not the property of any State, of any church, of any school of thought, or even of his 
or her family. A child is a person. Parents, educators and society must direct their attention towards 
creating the conditions necessary to develop children's personalities, teach them about freedom 
and solidarity, and help them find the place in society that is open to any person and the rights 
that derive from it. 
Right from birth, children are consumers. Gradually, they come to play an active civic, social and 
economic role. One day, they will probably become parents themselves. It is therefore essential 
that they be prepared properly for all this. Such work is the joint reponsibility, first and foremost, 
of the child's parents, and also of society. Demographic policies should never consider children 
as an  instrument in the service of a State or a society. However, any State or society which did 
not seek to guarantee harmony between the elements of which it is made, especially its population, 
would create very serious problems for itself, whether it wished to do so or not. 
A child is the incarnation of hope. No child is unnecessary. This is a fact which all policies, starting 
with family policies, must take into account, so that all children, whatever their social origins, 
and irrespective of any handicaps they may suffer from, may have equal rights - and therefore 
equal opportunites- and be able to express the richness of their personalities throughout their 
personal, family and working lives. The Economic and Social Committee has stressed on many 
occasions that this should mean areas as varied as the right to culture, the right to a job, the 
right to health and social protection, and the right to housing. Much has still to be done in  all 
these areas. 
Of course, the maintenance and education of a child involves responsibilities and burdens for 
both  its family and  for society.  But a child adds that vital extra "something" to its parents' 
happiness. Social life is learnt together, and it is in  the family that a child first learns all about 
mutual support and loyalty. Thus, any developments in  marriage and family models should not 
be  prejudicial to children's rights, including the right to respect and  protection. 
Europe is a human, economic, social and cultural community, and it will be constructed all the 
more firmly if it is founded on a dynamic and harmoniously structured population, where each 
age has its place. This means that a higher birth rate is necessary in order to correct the present 
shape of the age pyramid, especially as  people are tending to live longer. 
1 .  Facts and  figures 
Introduction 
On  1 January 1985 the Ten  had 273 million inhabitants. There is a trend towards zero growth in 
population: the average annual population growth rate has declined from 0.88°/o  in  1960-61  to 
0.34°/o  in 1979-80 and 0.19°/o  in 1982-83. This trend towards demographic stagnation has various 
causes: a large drop in the fertility rate (between the high point of 1964 and the low point of 1978, 
after which the rate stabilised somewhat, the number of births fell by 30°/o: 3,295 as compared 
with 4,692 million; Table 1), a reduction in immigration, a gradual slowdown in the decline of the 
general mortality rate (since 1960 the number of deaths has moved in parallel with the population 
trend: the rising proportion of old people in the population offsets the effects of a falling mortality 
rate in various age groups). 
Although the rate of population growth is slowing down in all the Member States (Table 2), there 
are nevertheless major differences between individual countries. For about a decade (since 1974) 
Germany has been experiencing a decline in population; four countries (UK, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and  Denmark) have had zero growth since the beginning of the eighties; another country is in 
a similar position (Italy:  + 0.20°/o  per annum between 1980 and 1982); on the other hand, owing 
to the relatively high proportion of young people in their population, France, the Netherlands and 
Greece have had an  appreciably higher growth rate (0.5, 0.6 and 0.8°/o  per annum respectively 
between 1980 and 1982). Only Ireland, with 1.6°/o  for the same period, diverges appreciably, this 
being  due to the particular history of the country:  a turnaround  in  the traditional  pattern of 
migration in the seventies (time-honoured emigration giving way to substantial immigration) and 
above all continued relatively high fertility (about 4 children per woman on average) up until the 
end of the sixties. 
5 The gradual decline in  the mortality rate 
After making considerable progress in the 1950s (for the Ten as a whole the average life expectancy 
of women increased by 5.4 years, that of men by 3.6 years), the fight against death marked time 
during the 1960s. The rise in  life expectancy was one third of the previous decade's increase. 
In some countries there was no increase or even a fall for men. There was further improvement 
in  the 1970s, but with more modest increases than in the 1950s: 2 years for men, 3 for women. 
Hence for some thirty years the gains in female life expectancy have regularly been, on average, 
half as much again as those for men. The difference in average life expectancy between the two 
sexes has therefore risen from 4.2  years in  1951  to 7.3  years in  1981  (Table 3). 
As the trend in  infant mortality rates for EEC countries shows, the differences in mortality are 
now relatively small: there has been a rapid improvement in the less well-placed countries (Italy, 
Greece) over recent decades. But progress has been general: everywhere infant mortality rates 
in 1982 were 1/2- 1/3 of what they were in 1960. Four countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
France)  now have an  infant mortality rate below 10°/o,  a threshold which for a long time was 
considered to be impossible to pass; nor, so far, has there been any sign of a let-up in the fall 
in these countries. For the Community of Ten as a whole the infant mortality rate is 10.4°/o (Table 4). 
From a purely demographic point of view, given the results already achieved, one cannot expect 
a major overall gain. If the average infant mortality rate for the Community was brought down 
to the lowest national rate, that of Denmark, this would mean gaining some 7,000 children. But 
as each human life is of great value, particularly that of a child, it is hoped that the fight against 
infant mortality will be continued, especially since infant mortality, like death in general, is still 
distributed very  unequally from a social, sociological and geographical point of view. 
Halt to the international migration of labour 
As a result of the decisions taken in 1973-74 by the main host countries, the immigration of workers 
into the EEC has been halted. This is reflected statistically in the net migration trend: net migration 
fell from + 4,545,000 in 1960-1973 (i.e. an annual average of + 325,000) to + 1,033,000 in 1974-1981 
(i.e. an  annual average of + 129,000, or about one third). Residual immigration is primarily of 
families (reunification) and  secondarily political (refugees) or illegal. Its direct contribution to 
population growth (net inflow) is markedly less than before 1973, but the indirect influence of 
international migration, via  the foreign  population already present,  is far from  negligible: on 
account of its relatively high proportion of young people and greater fertility, the foreign population 
slows down the overall  population decrease. 
As soon as sufficient reliable information is available, there should be  an  examination of the 
demographic effect of the legislation which, since 1982,  has encouraged migrant workers and 
their families to return to their countries of origin. 
The falling birth  rate:  a general phenomenon of  major proportions 
The variation in the natural increase is very different from that in net migration: while the latter 
fell by about 200,000, the natural increase dropped by 1,500,000 (500,000 around 1980 as compared 
with 2,000,000 around 1964). As the number of deaths has barely increased, this change is therefore 
due essentially to the fall in the number of births. The decline is 30°/o  for the Community as a 
whole.  In  some cases,  such  as Germany and  particularly Italy, the fall  has been  much more 
pronounced,  reaching  40°/o  to 45°/o  (Graph 1):  in  1964  the annual  number of births exceeded 
1 million, but is now around 600,000: relatively small generations were involved in the fall in fertility. 
Conversely, in the Netherlands and to a lesser extent in  France, the fluctuation has been less 
pronounced; the fall has been cushioned by the presence of relatively large cohorts in the high 
fertility age groups. The trend in the UK is somewhere between the two; while, as in Italy and 
Germany, 1964 was a high point with over a million births, the decline has been less steep, the 
number of births wavering around 700,000 since 1974 (table 5). 
6 This falling birth rate is primarily linked to the fertility trend, which went into a sharp decline in 
the countries of Western Europe in 1964,  and a little later in  Southern Europe. With, for 1980, 
an  index of 2.2  children on  average per women,  Greece maintains a fertility rate near to the 
generation  replacement  level,  while  the  historically  unique  position  of  Ireland  is  gradually 
disappearing: its index has fallen from 4 to 3.  It is unprecedented in time of peace that in all the 
other countries the fertility rate should, some ten years ago, have dropped below replacement 
level  (2.1  under  present  conditions)  and  remained  very  low,  without  any  sign  as  yet  of an 
appreciable and lasting upturn (Table 6). 
Four Member States have a fertility index of 1.5 or less (Germany,  Denmark,  Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands), two others are around 1.6 (Belgium and Italy), while the UK and France have stabilized 
around 1.8 (graph 2). 
However, these indices tend to exaggerate, in  one or other direction, the actual changes from 
one  generation  to another.  Thus,  up  until  the  beginning  of the  1960s,  the  rise  in  the  index 
exaggerated the increase in the final number of births for the generations concerned; conversely, 
the fall in the indices from 1964 onwards overstates somewhat the decline in  the final number 
of births for these generations. These changes in the timetable of family formation are expressed 
statistically in the trend of the average age at maternity. Up until the beginning of the 1970s the 
average age at childbirth was in most instances falling continually (people getting married earlier); 
since then, despite the fact that large families have become rarer (births in  older age groups), 
the trend is in the opposite direction: the average age at maternity has begun to rise appreciably 
(  + 0.5 year, for example, in Germany, France, Denmark and the Netherlands, between 1977 and 
1982). Young couples, if they get married, marry later. Furthermore, the interval between marriage 
and the birth of the first child and between successive births is tending to increase (Table 7). 
Although it is difficult to anticipate the future behaviour of generations which are still far from 
having reached the upper age limit of fertility (50),  we can still provide fairly precise indications 
about those who, having reached their thirties, have already had most of their children. We can 
see that, since the generation of 1950, fertility has been appreciably lower than the replacement 
level; this was the case even earlier (1940 generation) in Germany and Italy, and probably in England 
and Denmark too: on account of the infant and juvenile mortality rate at this time, the replacement 
threshold was higher than its present value (for the female generations of 1930, 1940 and 1950 
in  France, 2.35,  2.30  and 2.20  respectively were required). The final number of children for the 
1954 generation was 1.55 in Germany, 1.7 in Denmark and the Netherlands, about 1.9 in Italy and 
England, 2.0 in France. Whichever country we look at, the number of offspring will therefore be 
insufficient - by from 6°/o  (France) to 30°/o  (Germany) - to guarantee a one-for-one replacement 
of mothers by  daughters (Table 8). 
The disappearance of  large families 
The  decline in  fertility has not affected the proportion of first children, second children, etc. 
uniformly, and in this respect there are major differences from one country to another. In France, 
for example, there has been hardly any decline in first child frequency, this remaining close to 
the physiological maximum; in Germany, on the other hand, a marked fall can now be seen from 
one generation to the next: many couples are choosing not to have any children at all (in the 1954 
generation, 1 woman in 5,  as compared with 1 in 10 in  France). Similar differences are found in 
the case of second children; according to some estimates (Munoz Perez, 1984), a little less than 
half the women of the 1954 generation in Germany have two or more children, as compared with 
nearly two-thirds in France. But beyond these differences from one country to another, there is 
an  underlying similarity: the declining number of "large" families (defined  as  with 3 or more 
children), which largely explains the fall in the fertility indices. Increasingly the cutoff point is 
between the second and third child. Thus in France, in the 1930 generation, four women in  ten 
had a third child (or more), while for the 1950 generation the figure is only two in ten. 
7 The trend, in the different Member States, in the proportion of third or higher order births in total 
births clearly reflects this structural change. Setting aside Ireland, in a mere twenty-odd years 
this proportion  has  been  nearly halved:  in  1960  it ranged  from  28°/o  (Germany)  to 42°/o  (the 
Netherlands), in 1982 from  15°/~ (Luxembourg) to 23°/o  (France and UK). The most marked falls 
are in  the Netherlands and  Denmark (Table 9). 
A shake-up in  the marriage pattern 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the fall in the birth rate has been reinforced by changes in the 
marriage pattern: the number of marriages has declined; people are older when they get married, 
and their marriages are becoming more fragile. In all the Member States marriage, often preceded 
by a varying period of cohabitation, is being entered into at a later age and less frequently, so 
that between the beginning of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the total number of 
marriages contracted fell by 20°/o, from 2.0 to 1.6 million. The index of first marriages, calculated 
every year from the number of first marriages according to age, has fallen rapidly from around 
1,  or even  temporarily above 1 (owing to the fact that people were getting married younger) to 
levels unprecedented in  history (0.5  in  Denmark, 0.6  in  Germany) (Table 10). 
In  other words, if the behaviour observed over recent years in  the various age groups were to 
hold for a whole generation, throughout its life-cycle, marriage would cease to be the norm and 
would involve only half or a little over half of the population. However,  it is likely that in this 
instance, too, the current indices give a somewhat exaggerated view of the trend over successive 
generations: the scale of the changes in the timing of marriage, reflected in the trend in the average 
age at first marriage, indicates that the fall in the indices is intensified by the upward movement 
of the age at which people are getting married. After having fallen during the 1960s, the average 
age at first marriage moved up again during the next decade (Table 11). 
What has been the marriage pattern of the post-war generations according to the current data? 
In the generations born between 1940 and 1945, practically all women (91  to 99°/o  according to 
country)  got  married  sooner or later;  in  later generations an  ever-increasing  proportion  has 
remained single. Of the women born in 1960, the proportion of single (or pseudo-single) women 
at the age of 50  should reach a quarter in  England and  France, a third in  Germany and nearly 
a half in Denmark (where the number of couples cohabiting outside wedlock could, in time, exceed 
the number of married couples (Table 12). 
The  increase  in  the  frequency  of  cohabitation  outside  wedlock  among  young  people  is 
accompanied, with a varying time-lag, by an increase in the proportion of births outside marriage. 
However, this increase is not at all in proportion to the scale of the decline in marriages, owing 
in part to the above-mentioned time-lag, and in part to the difference in fertility between the two 
types of union: the fertility of unmarried couples is lower than that of married couples (in some 
countries, such as Germany, the birth of children to cohabiting couples is still relatively rare). 
For the Community as a whole, the proportion of births outside marriage doubled between 1970 
and  1982 (10.2°/o  in  1982 compared with 5.2°/o  in  1970) (Table 13). 
While the trend is common to all the countries, its strength varied considerably from one to another. 
With nearly 40°/o  of births outside marriage, the position of Denmark is quite exceptional (the 
proportion of such births more than quintupled between 1960 and 1982); the UK and France have 
about the same figures (14°/o  and 13°/o  respectively in  1982);  then come, with a much smaller 
proportion, Germany (8.5°/o),  Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (6°/o),  Belgium (5°/o) and 
finally Greece (less than 2°/o). The trend is by far the slowest in Germany, although its index of 
first marriages is the closest to that of Denmark (between 1960 and 1982 the proportion of births 
outside marriage increased by only a quarter). 
Over the same period, since the middle of the 1960s, and since 1970 especially, there has been 
a very rapid rise in the number of divorces, which tripled between 1964 and 1982. The ending of 
marriage by divorce is becoming more frequent, and is occurring at an earlier stage in the marriage. 
The increase in the frequency of divorce and the shorter duration of the marriages dissolved in 
this way are reflected in a soaring index of divorces (Table 14): between 1965 and 1980 the divorce 
rate, measured by the current indices, doubled, tripled or quadrupled, depending on the country. 
8 According to the initial data available, the final proportion of marriages contracted in 1975 and 
ending in divorce should be more than 1 in 5 in  France, more than 1 in 4 in England/Wales and 
nearly 1 in  3 in  Denmark (Festy, 1983). 
The erosion of the traditional model of marriage is therefore clear: people are marrying later and 
fewer people are getting married; marriages are being ended earlier and more often by divorce. 
There  is a big  increase in  the number of people living alone, such as  widowers, widows and 
divorcees either without children or whose children live away from them. Cohabitation is growing 
and a new pattern is emerging, whereby couples live together periodically while at the same time 
maintaining their individual homes. There are more single parent families. These new situations 
help increase physical insecurity (especially for people living alone) and psychological and moral 
insecurity (where duration is no guarantee). 
While single parent families often tackle their educational duties with a good deal of courage, 
their educational and support role is more difficult because a child needs a mother and a father 
and  parental responsibilities are generally better shared. 
2.  Possible causes of the fertility crisis 
The changes which are affecting family life and the institution of marriage are complex. One is 
immediately struck by two facts: 
the  international  convergence of trends,  despite differences in  family legislation and  in 
economic, sociological, political or religious environment; and 
the relative concomitance of a number of changes in behaviour: the decline in fertility, par-
ticularly the increasing tendency not to have a third (or successive) child; later marriage; a 
rise in the number of couples cohabiting out of wedlock with a corresponding drop in the 
frequency of marriage and  in the proportion of children born in wedlock; a big increase in 
the number of divorces; a rise in  the number of women having a job, etc. 
All these phenomena accompany the gradual arrival at adulthood of the generations born after 
the war. One is thus faced with a fundamental change in attitudes to life which is not caused 
by political or economic factors peculiar to a region or social background. There is definitely a 
major transformation underway affecting all the advanced countries and sparing no element of 
their social or regional structure, and the movement is universal. The causes are therefore to be 
sought in  factors which are deep-seated, common to all the western countries and capable of 
changing mentalities. 
Among these factors, the following may be  mentioned: 
The continued rise in average life expectancy and the progressive elimination of pre-adult mortality 
As a result, the births which were at one time needed to replace children who died in  infancy 
are no longer necessary and, above all, death before the age of 50  has become so rare that a 
new code of ethics has come into being: death is a taboo subject and everyone behaves as if 
he  or she were immortal; the biological need  to reproduce is less obvious, and  less pressing. 
It is neither unreasonable nor illogical to suppose that life expectancy will continue to rise, thanks 
to progress in  preventive techniques, food hygiene, medicine and surgery. For instance, some 
types of research on the DNA chain should lead to a considerable increase in the age at which 
people die and to the disappearance of certain signs of ageing. 
Although such progress is a good thing, and nobody would seriously think of asking that it be 
stopped or even subject to a moratorium, it does require vital demographic solutions to be found 
for achieving a balanced age pyramid structure; as people live longer, something must be done 
to prevent them  feeling  useless as  they see  themselves excluded from  all  sorts of activities 
because of their age; more training and information must be provided, so that people do not feel 
overtaken by technological progress, and a re-think is required about welfare financing norms, 
which have been  profoundly influenced by 30 years of exceptional economic growth. With the 
recession, should we  not think about other types of financing, especially as needs differ and 
accumulate (old age,  unemployment, family)? 
9 There are still profound social inequalities where illness and death are involved. Demographic 
statistics highlight such situations, which pose questions for those who have to administer health 
and social policies, policies which should be  marked by solidarity. 
The extraordinary economic growth of the post-war period 
Wages tripled in real terms in the space of twenty-five years. Both the rate at which consumption 
has increased  and  its present  level  are  without precedent  in  history. At the same time,  this 
exceptional improvement in living standards has led to a rise in aspirations even more rapid than 
the increase in incomes. With the development of the media, people have become much more 
aware of differences in economic and social position than in the past, and much more sensitive 
to them (political and social debates on the rise in prices, pay, welfare benefits, various forms 
of indexing, etc.). In this context, children are seen as restricting the ability to maintain or increase 
consumption; deciding to have a child, let alone more than one, means accepting a big drop in 
one's standard of living for at least twenty years, despite the compensation of family benefits 
and lower taxes. Legislation aimed at offsetting the costs of having a family closes only a small 
part of the gap in the standard of living between families and childless couples. 
The rapid rise in the direct, and especially the indirect, costs of having children 
In  a  wage-earning  urban  civilization,  where  the  production  and  reproduction  functions  are 
completely separated, and where the old mutual help networks are disappearing, the decision 
to have a child means of course the creation of a unique source of joy and gratification, but it 
also means that one's independence is curtailed. Having a child means giving up a certain life-
style, particularly as regards leisure (outings, weekends, holidays in faraway places) and money 
and time in general. In addition, when there is a second and especially a third child, the mother 
has to give up her job at least temporarily, with all the psychological and economic consequences 
that this involves: difficulties in finding a job later on,  having to start a career from scratch at 
the age of 35 or 40, loss of pension contributions, but, above all, concentration on domestic duties 
and having fewer social contacts, the whole being capped, as it were, by the loss of her wages 
and  the consequent  feeling  of being  completely dependent  financially on  her husband. The 
household is deprived of income which is very often indispensable (e.g. where loans have to be 
repaid, the husband's income is inadequate, ....  ).  All this is accentuated when - as  is the case 
among the younger generations- the woman has the same level of education as her male partner 
or higher. This phenomenon may be further exacerbated by the trend towards declining purchasing 
power and rising prices. 
A vague feeling of unease about the future 
The economic and social situation also plays a part in the fears felt by couples, not only for their 
own future but also for that of their children. 
Having a child means shouldering a long-term responsibility, and doing everything necessary to 
launch that child successfully into adulthood- if possible on a higher social orbit than one's own. 
But the future seems uncertain; the massive rise in unemployment among the young makes people 
think that today's children will find it more difficult to carve out a niche in society than was the 
case a few decades ago. 
Moreover, young adults are now both more aware of their responsibility as parents towards their 
children and more uncertain of their own capability of facing up to that responsibility. The meaning 
of living together as a couple, whether married or not, has changed: people live together more 
for love than for reasons of financial interest or duty; the decision to live with a person is no longer 
an irreversible one, but the decision to have a child is. For parents to fall down on their responsi-
bilities towards the child is a very grave dereliction of their duty. 
10 The possibility of completely planning the birth of one's children and the will  to do so 
Not only have young people today easy and effective means of doing this, but, above all, they 
wish to eliminate any element of chance in this area. While previous generations were somewhat 
hazy about their plans as parents, those today reject the idea of having an unplanned child. The 
liberalization of contraception and abortion tends more to highlight the emergence of this new 
wish than provide the means of implementing it. There has been a continuous fall in fertility both 
in countries that were late in  liberalizing and in  the other countries; in countries where the fall 
in fertility set in before liberalization, the trend has not been accentuated following changes in 
legislation. 
It is probable that if births can be planned more precisely, they will be less frequent. In particular, 
the phenomenon of the "later addition", born several years after the preceding child and when 
the parents are  somewhat older will tend to occ.ur less often, if not disappear. 
A  number of other underlying  factors,  such  as  taxation,  unsuitable housing,  the  feeling  of 
overcrowding  which  has resulted  from  urbanization  and  which  has  become more noticeable 
through the increased use of the car, concern about the environment and industrial pollution, 
fears  about world  over-population  (feelings which  are  v~ry widespread  in  the most densely-
populated areas of Europe, such as West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark), the 
impression of saturation, unease and danger which has be'en  put about by the media, and even 
the ultimate threat of total destruction in  a nuclear holocaust. 
Finally, the absence of blueprints for our societies, where the level of consumption is still high 
but where religious, or simply disinterested, activities are dying out, where social ties are becoming 
looser and are only tightened up on rare occasions to defend highly material and sometimes even 
selfish interests, and where the political parties in  power sometimes have wafer-thin majorities 
which reflect the deep divisions in  the electorate. It is interesting here to recall the period just 
after the last war, when the time seemed least suited for a rise in fertility: wages were low, many 
things were rationed, there was a housing shortage, and yet couples were fired by the ideal of 
rebuilding their countries materially and decided to have more children. This tends to highlight 
the moral and social factors - solidarity in  particular- which affect the personal demographic 
choices of couples as well as public opinion in general. The question is whether we really have 
the ability to change our life style, to share more, to put real  needs before mere status. 
One's mind turns naturally to the present economic recession and the unemployment it has led 
to, which has hit women and young adults particularly hard. But it should not be forgotten that 
the demographic crisis appeared well before the economic crisis, and while the latter may have 
aggravated it, it was certainly not its primary cause. 
In conclusion, it is worth remembering one basic fact: fertility started to fall simultaneously in 
all the highly industrialized countries of the Community; all the fertility indicators show a sudden 
decline beginning in 1964-1965. There was no change at this time in the factors that traditionally 
contribute to a secular fall in fertility (urbanization, industrialization, increase in education and 
the number of women with jobs, etc.) and the economic situation was still very favourable, with 
high growth rates. The socio-economic indicators showed no interruption in the trend. 
But an event was taking place which went completely unnoticed at the time: the first generations 
born after the war were starting to reach child-producing age. These post-war generations adopted 
behaviour which, in  many ways, was quite different from that of their elders: 
Not only had these generations not experienced the Great Depression, or war, or hardship, 
but their childhood and adolescence had been marked by a period of strong and sustained 
economic  growth  quite  unique  in  modern  history.  The  consumption  of  goods  soared; 
consumption  gradually  became  a  new  way  of  life.  Society  itself was  even  labelled  the 
"consumer society" and rejected as such by students, in the revolts at western universities 
in  1967-1968. 
11 The post-war generations witnessed the most remarkable revolution In education; there was 
an explosion in the numbers of those attending school and university. But this revolution did 
not yield all the fruits it promised; the growth in the number of diplomas did not stand up 
to the test of the market place: people gradually lost confidence in educational establishments, 
which often seemed poorly suited to fulfil the hopes of upward social mobility placed In them: 
young  people  with  paper  qualifications  found  that  these  meant  nothing,  and  that 
unemployment lay in  wait for them. This trend was evident, albeit in  a masked form,  from 
the mid-1960s;  after the world recession (from  1973-1974 onwards) it emerged  much more 
clearly. 
The rise in the level of education among women went hand in  hand with a number of other 
factors which were equally indicative of the profound changes taking place in the status of 
women: the rise in  the number of women  in  paid employment, the rapid modernization of 
electrical household goods (especially washi~g machines), control over fertility, the growth 
in  the number of magazines for women, the spread of new demands ...  Women's horizons 
were  gradually extending beyond the home. 
While the relationship between the pursuit of an  occupation by women and fertility is unclear, 
there is no doubt that, (i) having a second wage raises a couple's aspirations, and thus increases 
the opportunity cost of having a child (as the mother's wage is lost while she gives up her job), 
and (ii) the more children a mother has, the more difficult it··is to reconcile the demands of a job 
with the demands of being a mother. Without any doubt, this is one of the most critical challenges 
to the future of western society. 
In the absence of adequate arrangements to enable women, and couples in general, to combine 
an occupation with the raising of a family, a good many family plans are revised downwards In 
view of the accumulation of constraints: the main decisions regarding  both career and  family 
planning are  concentrated into the same crucial · but short · phase of an  individual's life. 
Furthermore,  too  little emphasis  is  placed  on  the  importance of parenthood,  which  has  an 
economic value in  its own  right. 
3.  Implications of a continued low fertility rate 
The demographic situation !n the European Community has changed radically. Not only has the 
birth rate fallen to an historically unprecedented level, almost 20°/o  below replacement level, but 
the mortality rate is now falling only slowly, and only in the middle/advanced age groups; finally, 
although immigration still exceeds emigration, the numbers have become very small. Hence there 
is a marked slowdown in population growth and, if the present trends continue, in about ten years 
the population of the Community will cease to grow and gradually start to decline. Unless there 
is a major rise in fertility or mass immigration, demographic ageing (increase in the proportion 
of old people in the total population) will continue its time-honoured slow rise for another twenty 
years or so before suddenly accelerating around 2005·2010. An ageing of the working population 
will make itself felt much earlier. Up to now, however, this trend has been offset by the increase 
in the number of young women in employment and above all the rapid fall in the number of those 
working after 55. 
The demographic prospects for the European Economic Community 
For the Community as a whole the main findings are based on  two hypotheses for the fertility 
rate (in each case net migration is taken as zero and the same mortality rate is assumed: average 
life expectancy increases slightly; the data are taken from the most recent UN forecasts in 1980). 
However, to illustrate more clearly the implications of different fertility scenarios, estimates are 
given for the total population of two countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, up 
until the middle of the next century (likewise assuming zero net migration and a slight increase 
in  average life expectancy). 
12 Total population 
The different fertility hypotheses produce very similar population totals at the beginning of the 
projection period, but these totals diverage rapidly as the horizon recedes. 
Taking into account the size of the reproductive age groups, the population will continue either 
to grow until the turn of the century (France) or to fall slightly (FRG), even if the fertility rate drops 
well below replacement level. But once the protective influence of the initial age structure has 
gone, the trends diverge increasingly with time. Thus in the case of France, the population in 
the year 2000 will be  between 54 and 60 million, according to the variant adopted (i.e. variation 
of only 6 million), from 2025 the difference will increase to 20 million, will reach nearly 40 million 
in 2050 and finally exceed 80 million in 2100 (20 and 101  million inhabitants respectively); similarly, 
in the lowest hypothesis (average of 1.2 children per woman) the population of Germany will fall 
by 50°/o  in the first half of the next century, from 55 million in 2000 to a mere 27.5 million in 2050. 
The consequences of relatively small variations in  the fertility rate are therefore crucial in  the 
long term for total population: in  France's case, the highest and  lowest hypotheses, although 
quite close to each other (1.5 and 2.4 children per woman), result in a 1 to 5 difference between 
total populations after one and a quarter centuries: if fertility drops to 1.5 and stays about there 
for the  whole of the  next century,  France  will  have  a  population  of only 20 million in  2100. 
Conversely, a gradual rise in fertility and its maintenance around an average of 2.4 children would 
lead to a population of over 100 million. 
Birth rate 
From the point of view of economic and social policies, the most important demographic indicator 
is the birth rate. It is the birth rate which determines, five or six years later, the number of primary 
school entries, eighteen years later the number of new electors, twenty years later the number 
of potential new entrants on  the labour market (and hence the number of people paying social 
security contributions and  taxes), sixty years later the number of retirements and pensioners. 
The future repercussions of demographic trends stem therefore from the reduction in  the total 
number of births and  not merely from variations in  the fertility rate. 
In the long term, differences in the fertility rate quickly become decisive. The choice of fertility 
hypothesis  becomes  increasingly  important  as  the  horizon  recedes:  for  the  birth  rate,  the 
divergence between the highest and lowest hypotheses increases quasi-exponentially with the 
result that the ratio is 1 to 10 in 2100 (159,000 births in  France in the low hypothesis, 1,672,000 
in the high). In 2050 the ratio is 1 to 4: for Germany 200,000 births (compared with 600,000 today) 
with a fertility rate of 1.2 and 827,000 with a fertility rate of 2.25; for France 300,000 births (compared 
with 750,000 today) with a fertility rate of 1.5 and  1,270,000 with a fertility rate of 2.4. 
A fall in fertility has an immediate impact on the base of the age pyramid. These effects are acute 
already. We are experiencing an abrupt contraction in the number of under-15s. The fertility rate 
of the  1960s  pointed to 40 million  under-15s  in  Western  Europe (Belgium,  France,  Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland) in 1985; the actual figure is expected to be 
only 29 million, showing the medium-term effect of variations in  the fertility rate. 
Age distribution 
Graph 3 shows the population pyramid (EEC 10)  for 1 January 1985. The slump in  fertility has 
already made a severe dent in the base of the pyramid, greater even than the combined deficit 
of births in  the last two wars. 
The long-term consequences of a continuing low fertility rate on the age pyramid are illustrated 
by the results of a calculation made for France, taking the same fertility hypotheses as Table 16 
(average of 1.5: 1.8: 2.1  and 2.4 children per woman) and covering the period 1975-2050. Over the 
years the age pyramid changes shape, starting at the base and working up: in 2000, i.e.  25 years 
after the start of the projections, only the under-25s are affected by changes: in 2025 the differences 
extend to the under-50s, and so on. In 2050 the shape of the age pyramid is very different depending 
13 on the variants used. The "high" hypothesis (2.4) produces a true pyramid shape with a relatively 
wide base, while the "low" hypothesis produces a truncated shape with a very narrow base: the 
lower the age group, the greater the decline in numbers. For the new-born group, the ratio is 1 
to 4 between the lowest and highest variants, while for the very old the numbers are absolutely 
identical (Graph 4). 
Even if the base of the age pyramid shrinks in both absolute and relative terms, the top is bound 
to grow in relative terms and to an extent markedly above that currently indicated, particularly 
in the highest age groups. In view of the considerable progress made by research into the human 
ageing process, the chances of extending average life expectancy seem far from exhausted: a 
boom in the number of elderly people therefore seems inevitable, and the higher the age group 
the greater the increase. The precise proportion of old people in the total population will depend 
on whether fertility remains low (or even drops further) or revives. At all events there will be an 
inevitable ageing of the population (unless fertility returns to its post-war level  or there is a 
resumption of mass immigration). The question is basically one of degree: in a country such as 
Germany, even without a substantial fall in the mortality rate and assuming a fertility rate slightly 
above its current level (1.5 instead of 1.3), the number of old people (65 and over) would exceed 
the number of young people (under 19) in about thirty years, even though in 1977 the ratio was 
1 to 2 in favour of young people (9.1  and 16.5 million respectively). In the low hypothesis, the closest 
to the present trend, it will take only fifty years for the initial 2:  1 ratio to be  reversed in  favour 
of the elderly: thus in 2040 there will be twice as many old as young people (9.3 and 4.8 million 
respectively). 
It is as if a proportion of the young population were to disappear to be replaced by a corresponding 
increase in the elderly population. Continuation of the present fertility rate will result in the not 
too distance future in  an  inversion of the age pyramid. 
Inertia is a characteristic feature of demography. Every child born today will count in the population 
of Europe for at least 75 years; catastrophe apart, he will still be there to see in the second half 
of the next century. The surpluses or deficits of present generations vis-a-vis their predecessors 
will have a lasting effect on the pyramid. In demography the consequences of current trends go 
far beyond the present and leave an indelible mark for nearly a century. Demographic phenomena 
carry great weight; their influence tends to grow as the horizon recedes. The process is cumulative: 
the daughters of today are the mothers of tomorrow. Those not born can never be replaced: there 
will be that many fewer possible mothers tomorrow. The consequences of certain trends appear 
only in the very long term, but then on a massive scale. In a country such as France, for instance, 
to freeze the old-age index at its 1983 level and prevent a worsening of the burden imposed by 
a rising proportion of elderly people, a total adult population (20 to 60 years) of 41.7 million would 
be needed in 2035 instead of the 26.6 million forecast: the deficit is around 15 million. However, 
as a comparison of the demographic history of the various European countries shows, such a 
low fertility scenario would only materialize if there were no influx of immigrants. There is a close 
link, over a long period, between the fertility rate and migration flows. Under these circumstances 
it seems quite possible that the rate of demographic ageing will be slowed down by immigration. 
But the size of the deficit of young people and adults is such that, unless immigration is on a 
massive scale and hence liable to change radically the population of the societies concerned, 
immigration will not be  able to prevent demographic ageing. 
While in the medium term, taking into account the available labour force (high unemployment 
rate,  increase in the number of women at work, continued entry of large age groups on to the 
labour market), the role of migration would seem to be only minimal, in the longer term, when 
the  potential  labour force  begins  to  decline  (small  age  groups  reaching  working  age),  the 
phenomenon  should  reappear,  all  the more so as the migratory pressure from  the southern 
countries can only increase over the coming decades. But the scale of such migratory flows is 
too uncertain for any precise figures to be given. Thus in the following comments attention will 
be concentrated on a low fertility scenario with zero net migration. 
14 This is only a hypothesis which could be invalidated by migratory flows whose nature and scale 
it is, however, difficult to predict at the moment. Without being over-pessimistic, it does seem 
a good idea to consider this eventuality. It must be stated that in view of the profound cultural 
differences involved, it will be  much easier to build multiracial societies if the host societies 
themselves have a sufficient number of young people in  their population. 
The economic and  social consequences of continued low fertility 
While the idea of a revival in fertility enjoyed some popularity during the seventies, nowhere has 
this actually happened yet; nor is there a shortage of arguments to support the idea that there 
will, on the contrary, be a further downturn. The hypothesis of a continuation of present fertility 
rates is given further credence by the fact that fertility has remained around its historical minimum 
for about a decade in  those countries first to experience the decline. 
If such an hypothesis turns out to be true, the consequences are twofold: firstly, in the short and 
medium term (up to around 1990) they are generally beneficial, at least as far as the visible changes 
wrought by low fertility are concerned; secondly, the longer term consequences are undoubtedly 
adverse to the Community. The  probable situation can be  summarized as follows: 
Short and  medium-term consequences 
Provided that young people actually find a job, the fall in the number of young people will mean 
a reduction in certain financing requirements: education, health, family benefits, etc. To a certain 
extent such an  effect is mechanical and  hence inevitable. On  the other hand,  the economic 
repercussions are more debatable because they are less direct and more contradictory. 
a)  Repercussions for public finances 
The fall in  the birth rate may seem doubly beneficial for public finances: firstly, it reduces the 
expenditure necessary to cover young people's needs; secondly, it tends to swell tax revenue 
and social security contributions by increasing the number of couples with two incomes. The 
social security budget, for instance, benefits in the short and medium term from any fall in fertility; 
only in the long term, when the small age groups reach working age, is there a lasting reversal 
of the effects. Initially, therefore, the fall in the birth rate brings numerous financial advantages, 
all other factors being equal: a fall in  health expenditure arising from maternity and childhood; 
reduction in expenditure on family allowances, further reduced by the dwindling number of large 
families (benefits are generally graduated according to the number of children); decline in  tax 
allowances for dependent children; increased social security revenue (higher proportion of women 
in  work). 
b)  Economic repercusions 
The medium-term economic repercussions of demographic changes comprise both definite effects 
(good and  bad) and  indefinite effects, which are generally controversial. 
Definite effects: 
- Growth then decline in  potential working  population 
After a lengthy phase of growth in the labour supply, reinforced in the current period by the entry 
of relatively large generations on  to the labour market, from the 1990s we  are gradually going 
to see a fall in the number of young people entering working life. For some time this decline may 
be lessened by a rise in the number of women at work. But in the long term the fall in the labour 
supply will be  so great that it cannot be  offset by the usual means. 
·  Depressive effects on  certain sectors 
A fall in fertility narrows the base of the age pyramid; consequently it implies a dropping-off in 
demand for the products bought by these age groups. First, babies; then it is the turn of the pre-
school age group, then school age, and finally adolescents and young adults. During the sixties 
the increase in the youth population led to an explosion in certain specialized markets (books, 
records,  motorcycles,  various  products  for  sports,  leisure  and  daily  life,  ...  ).  Faced  with  a 
contraction of their potential customers, these markets must now rely, if they are to expand (or 
simply maintain) their business, on  finding new outlets for the goods and services which they 
offer or on  a signficiant rise in  the standard of living. 
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supplies; b) housing. The future decline in the number of young adults, the reduction in family 
size and the slowdown in geographical mobility should lead to a slump in the demand for new 
buildings. 
Less certain aspects and imponderables: 
•  Volume and structure of consumption 
The impact on aggregate consumption of the trend towards smaller families will be influenced 
by a number of variables such as changes in  income per capita and the increase in the number 
of women in paid employment. In the medium term, however, consumption per person is likely 
to go up. The question is, however, whether it will increase enough to offset the slowdown in 
the increase in the number of consumers on  the domestic market. 
The stabilization of the population and the change in the age pyramid is likely to lead to a major 
change in the pattern of demand. The demographic slowdown has a major effect on sectors such 
as agriculture (food is virtaully income inelastic, i.e. the demand for food is basically a function 
of the  size  of the  population)<
1l,  building  and  construction  (demand  for schools,  hospitals, 
subsidized  housing,  roads,  various  infrastructure).  The  ageing  of  the  population  changes 
consumption; the demand for products more specific to the old (health, leisure, etc.) will expand, 
that for products specific to the young (post-natal care, school buildings and equipment) will lose 
ground relatively. 
·  Savings and investment 
Economic growth is not just a function of consumption and public expenditure. It also depends 
on the formation of capital, i.e. savings. These savings are provided to a large extent by households. 
The reduction in the size of the average family, by reducing consumption needs, tends to increase 
the proportion of income available for savings. Or at least so classical economics theory would 
have it. 
In reality, there is no straightforward link between savings and the size of families. The cost of 
an additional child may be met by cutting down non-essential expenditure, not by cutting savings. 
It is true that broadly speaking the smaller the number of dependent children the higher the level 
of savings, but this is only true for monetary savings. The reverse may be true if we consider saving 
in the sense of the formation of human capital. Schultz and Kuznets, for instance, have shown 
the crucial role played in long-term economic growth by investment in  human capital. 
We must also consider the quality of saving, and not just its quantity. In  the period when the 
French population was stable (first half of the century), the country had a high level of investment 
but that investment was unproductive or badly allocated. 
Although the financial impact of a drop in fertility is favourable in the medium term (less spending 
on the younger generation), the economic effects are definitely adverse in some sectors and overall 
controversial and less beneficial than is often supposed. Reduced spending on youth did not, 
in the countries most affected by the demographic decline, generate a positive growth differential. 
The reduction in fertility did not have the beneficial effects attributed to it around 1970, when 
enthusiasm for zero growth reached its peak in  the general public. 
Long-term consequences 
Continuing low fertility has two main consequences- political and economic. All factors lead to 
an ageing and weakening of the Community in both absolute and relative terms (particularly the 
latter) without securing a substantial improvement in  affluence. 
(1)  Clearly any assessment of the possible consequences for agriculture must also take account of its export potential. 
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A birth rate substantially below the replacement level leads to an ageing labour force in line with 
the ageing of the population generally. This will lead to a heavier burden on the economy. But 
it  is not  possible at  present  to gauge  accurately the  long-term  impact on  jobs of the  new 
technologies. 
- Contracting labour force, permanent shortage of young workers 
From the nineties, the number of new entrants to the labour force will dwindle to below that of 
departures. If the fertility rate remains unchanged, in the year 2000,  for the Community of 10, 
the number of people old enough to begin economically active life will be only two-thirds that 
of the number of people nearing the end of their working career. The impact of this factor on 
the size of the labour force will increase as time passes. 
- Ageing labour force 
At the moment the labour force is growing younger (earlier retirement, entry to the labour market 
of women and those born in the post-war baby-booms), but eventually it will start to age as the 
proportion of young people entering the labour market drops to unprecedented levels. 
Such  a  development  will  have  three  consequences:  upward  pressure  on  labour costs,  less 
geographical and occupational mobility, reduced renewal of the economically active population. 
The increase in  the proportion of elderly workers is liable to increase the conflict between the 
worsening shortage of young workers and the increasing tendency to peg  wages to length of 
service. In the countries which are advancing rapidly technologically, there will be an increasing 
temptation to rely on the best adapted and most productive sector of the labour force, i.e. to secure 
the early retirement of older workers, who earn higher wages and are assumed to be less efficient; 
this development will make for a further increase in social security costs. Japan is a case in point. 
In this scenario, production -provided there are enormous productivity gains-could be maintained 
by a smaller and smaller proportion of the population, basically the young and the middle-aged. 
This would lead to upward pressure on the wages of young workers, and might generate conflict 
about the distribution of incomes, especially as the few new entrants to the labour market will 
be  better trained and will thus tend to demand higher wages. 
The second consequence of an  ageing labour force would be a reduction in geographical and 
occupational mobility. Mobility is basically the prerogative of young people, whose roots (family, 
job, house ownership) are shallower than those of adults who have settled down in life. Small 
families are more geographically mobile, but this can be offset by the increasing trend towards 
two-income or even two-career couples. Increased competition, and continuing changes in  the 
international division of labour, accelerate both job repatterning and the geographical movement 
of industry. Steps should therefore be  taken to reduce the labour-market rigidities associated 
with an  ageing labour force. 
It is clear that the labour force is renewed  more slowly in a decreasing population than in an 
increasing population. The slower flow of new entrants to the labour market means a slower 
diffusion of technological innovation, since it is primarily through recently trained young people 
that skill patterns adapt to production requirements. The need for continuing training and retraining 
is greater in such a situation, leading to extra costs and a further reduction in  the number of 
persons available for work. 
- Dependence on inward migration 
Given the above factors and the loss of flexibility they imply, it is always possible that a new 
inflow of immigrant labour will be needed in ten years or so- especially since the birth-deficit 
generations, which will be better qualified; will be able to take up the more attractive jobs while 
the labour force from undeveloped countries will be very much a birth-surplus generation and 
mostly unskilled. The conventional problems associated with migration could thus be compounded 
by others linked with the demographic imbalance between sending countries and host countries. 
17 If it becomes structurally indispensable to the survival of European countries, immigration could 
take on a family and  permanent character, generating fundamentally new costs and demands. 
The  supplier countries will,  furthermore,  not be  European  but African  and  Asiatic. This will 
aggravate immigration difficulties (immigration from different ethnic groups and cultures, etc.). 
Faced with competition from newly industrializing countries with an  abundant supply of cheap 
labour, Europe, lacking raw materials, has only its human resources; if it does not want to be 
left behind, it must adapt, innovate, redevelop and thus call on external human resources; this 
will entail a danger of increased dependence, all the more intractable because the labour shortage 
caused by a collapse of the fertility rate will be  substantial and  lasting. 
- Increasing number of old people 
A drop in  fertility leads, in  relative terms, to replacement of the young age groups by the old. 
Some conclude that the increase in expenditure on the old is offset by a corresponding decrease 
in  expenditure on the young. The actual situation is much more complicated, for five reasons: 
The cost of supporting young people is met essentially by their families. But expenditure on 
old people is increasingly a charge on society, based on a precarious contract between the 
generations, and obviously does not have the same macro-economic impact on investment 
and  productivity. 
A young person does not cost society the same amount as an old person. Most old people 
(close on  two-thirds) are heads of households; children never (they are the third, fourth or 
whatever member of their household), so that their marginal cost is smaller. The existence 
of a household presupposes shared expenditure on accommodation, however many persons 
occupy it. Furthermore, consumption scales usually assume that a young child costs half 
as much as the first adult in the household. It is hard to imagine that old people need less, 
given that they are usually heads of household. 
The reduction of the cost of the younger generation and the increase in the cost of the older 
generation do not occur at the same time. When the cost of old people increases in the EEC, 
in the nineties and above all 2005-2010, the cost of young people will no longer be dropping. 
The previous economies will not have been "stored", let alone capitalized, so it is wrong to 
say that changes in  costs will balance each other out. 
The real decrease in the cost of young people is less than appears at first sight. It is not simply 
a function of the decrease in  the number of young people. The effects of such a decrease 
are not the same as those of an increase. More than three-quarters of the education budget, 
for instance, is made up of staff expenditure and fixed overheads. Furthermore, the change 
in the size of families is such that the average child belongs to a small family (1, 2 or 3 children). 
Obviously, the living and training costs of such children are generally higher. 
The change in the relative size of the major age groups must not mask the change in absolute 
numbers, whose economic and  political importance is far greater. 
Threat to competitiveness 
Continuing low fertility thus eventually generates a danger of a permanent shortage of young 
workers. These are the most mobile and  adaptable, and the best trained in  new technologies. 
Adjustment of the economy to changes in the international environment depends in part on them. 
There  are  also grounds for doubting the ability of economies to maintain their international 
competitiveness if they are subject to substantial pressures on their production costs (increasing 
scarcity of labour,  ageing  of the economically active population,  increase in  expenditure on 
pensions and  health, increase in  tax pressure on  the individual because of local and  regional 
depopulation). Especially if these economies are also affected by social changes which make 
society turn towards the past rather than the future. What happens to the spirit of initiative and 
innovativeness in  an  ageing and contracting population? 
18 A survey of economic history since the industrial revolution shows that over a very long period 
economic growth and population growth have not conflicted with each other. On  the contrary, 
they  have  gone  hand  in  hand  (though  it does  not  appear  possible  to  identify a  statistical 
relationship between the rates of growth of the economy and of population). An  evaluation of 
the major phases suggests that there is a fundamentally ambiguous link, if anything, between 
recession  and  population  contraction,  affluence  and  population  growth.  The  fact  that  the 
population explosion in Europe coincided with an unprecedented economic boom suggests that 
there may well have been a link and that consideration should be given to the hazards associated 
with a cessation of demographic growth-or even contraction. There is only one case of population 
stability in modern European history- that of France in the nineteenth century and the first half 
of the twentieth century. This period was an  adverse one for France not only in terms of power 
(France's share of the European economy dropped from 15.5°/o in 1800 to 5.2°/o  in 1950), but also 
in terms of the growth of affluence (between 1830 and 1930, for instance, real income per capita 
rose at an annual rate of 1.1 °/o  in France as against 1.2°/o  in the United Kingdom, 1.4°/o  in Germany 
and  1.6°/o  in  the United States). 
b)  Political repercussions 
The lags in  demographic transition (change from high death/birth rate to low death/birth rate) 
and their enormous impact on population figures have been particularly apparent in recent years. 
They lie behind the increased demographic contrast between rich and poor countries. The West 
has attained a sort of demographic maturity, herald of a period of ageing and its attendant effects; 
the less developed countries, pushed by the extraordinary youth of their population, are expanding-
and will continue to do so for a long time- at a rate of between 1.5 and 3.5°/o  per annum. 
- Towards new kinds of  relations 
The countries of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia), for example, have 
less than half the population of the Ten  (125 million as against 273 million in  1985), but nearly 
twice as many births (5.1  million compared with 3.2 million per annum). In these countries of North 
Africa, close to 4 million are older than 65, i.e. less than the number of births per annum and less 
than one-tenth the EEC figure (36.6 million in  1985). This comparison of the numbers of young 
and old people tells us a lot about the past and  the future. 
The above is typical of the general pattern. The demographic transition in the developing countries 
is occur.ring  at a rate of growth twice that experienced  by  Europe  in  the second  half of the 
nineteenth century, when the continent's population expansion was at its maximum. The more 
belated the transition, the sharper the expansion of the population during the transition period. 
In the period between the date when the death-rate began to drop and the date when the fertility 
rate  dropped  below the  replacement  level,  the  population of most  European  countries only 
increased by a factor of between 3 and 5.  But the population of Mexico- far from an exceptional 
case- will increase by a factor of between 7 and 10, depending on how quickly the fertility rate 
drops. While Asia and Latin America have reached the peak phase of their population expansion, 
in  black Africa (where the death rate  is still relatively high) the major increase in  the rate of 
population expansion still lies ahead. It is Africa which seems to have the largest potential - by 
far- for population growth. Table 17 compares the outlook for the next 40 years for the EEC and 
certain regions of Africa (UN  figures). 
It is doubtful whether societies where fifty and sixty year-olds are going to dominate, and where 
there will be more pensioners than children, can be genuinely forward-looking. It is more likely 
that they will devote themselves to contemplating their past grandeur. 
Demographic changes are slow and allow the time needed for adjustment. But the fact that they 
are relatively inconspicuous in the short term makes it easier to forget them. It is in the long term 
that demographic changes exert a crucial influence. People in the densely populated countries 
of  Europe  have  long  been  mesmerized  by  the  environmental  advantages  of  a  contracting 
population. We must now wake up to the possible long-term disadvantages, in particular those 
of the reversal of the age pyramid. The direct influence of an ageing population on social-security 
costs and taxation is obvious and familiar. But the more indirect impact on the ability of a society 
to master advanced technologies and to establish an  adequate foothold on  export markets is 
probably not insignificant, and doubtless still more crucial in  the long run. 
19 There is a divergence between the short-term interests of the individual and the long-term interests 
of society. Should not our leaders, who are responsible for the future well-being of society, ensure 
that their policies take account of those parents who, by deciding to have children, and by rearing 
and educating them, secure the future of the human, economic, social and cultural community? 
In the past, quite a large proportion of children were not born as the result of the deliberate choice 
of their parents. 
Today, childbirth is virtually a voluntary decision, made by women and couples. This development 
is irreversible, and will certainly be  reinforced by medical progress and the better provision of 
information. 
Economic and  social policies cannot disregard the demographic and family dimensions. The 
family, seen as a biological, emotional and educational unit, is a dynamic social force. Families 
play a crucial educational role. It is the social unit in which solidarity is first learnt. It is a dynamic 
unit of consumption. 
4.  Conclusions 
The birth rate in the EEC countries has fallen to unprecedented levels, well below the generation 
replacement threshold (the deficit ranges from 15°/o  to 40°/o, depending on the country). Recent 
trends indicate that, contrary to what was expected some years ago, there is little likelihood of 
any major spontaneous turnaround. If present behaviour patterns are maintained, the economic, 
social and political picture for Europe gives cause for concern, especially in view of the more 
or  less  automatic  effects  brought  about  by  the  ageing  of  the  population.  As  the  present 
demographic situation is unfavourable, and there is no indication of it getting better on its own, 
it is up to the public authorities, as guardians of the long-term interests of the societies in their 
charge, to concern themselves with the radically new factors which have led to such an imbalance 
and to help restore equilibrium to the age pyramid by making it easier for parents to choose what 
size family they want. 
While the decision to have children is one for couples (or women) alone, the choice of family size 
is not an abstract or once-and-for-all decision. Public opinion surveys in various countries show 
that, for any couple, family plans are likely to change over time in  the light of such things as 
changes in the economic situation and in social legislation. Many couples hesitate about what 
size family they want (most often between having two or three children); because of the many 
obstacles facing larger families in  a salaried and urbanized world, most of them decide on  the 
lower figure, but some say they are ready to consider having an additional child if society as a 
whole agreed to pay more towards bringing it up. 
Intervention by the public authorities is justified, in a modern democracy, by the state's brief to 
help its citizens achieve their personal goals, with priority being given to those which coincide 
with the general interest. In other words, the state's job is not to dictate to couples, but to allow 
them to have as wide a range of choices as possible in accordance with the principles of freedom 
and fairness. Thus, couples who wish to have no children - or no more children - should have 
the possibility of preventing births, which is now an accomplished fact. At the same time, couples 
who do wish to have children should be allowed to have sufficient resources to have real freedom 
of choice. 
In countries where the number of self-employed workers is largely tending to disappear- though 
this is not the case in all Member States, e.g. Italy- the economic benefits associated with the 
arrival of children no longer go to the family but to society at large, while most of the costs (which, 
moreover, are rising) are still borne by the family. In ancient societies, children helped to increase 
the income of the family business unit; but nowadays, the arrival of children leads to a cumulative 
fall in  the family's standard of living, due to the lack of adequate and  proper legislation. This 
drop in the standard of living is felt particularly acutely when a third child arrives, not only because 
this leads to direct and specific costs (mainly housing) but also because, very often, the mother 
has to give up her job, which leads to a big drop in  the family's income(
2
). 
(2)  The ESC has already drawn attention to this situation in its Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Decision on Specific Community 
Action to Combat Poverty (OJ  No.  C 25 of 28 January 1985). 
20 It is not surprising that in almost all the Member States, the recent fall in the birth rate is mainly 
due to the increase in the number of couples deciding not to have a third child. Such a situation 
calls for a political response consisting of finding ways of making it easier for couples to decide 
to have a third child, without in any way detracting from the importance of the benefits granted 
for the first or second child. 
But is such an aim practical? History suggests that it is. There are effective measures which are 
compatible with individual liberties. Two examples are provided by France after the Second World 
War and by East Germany over the past ten years. Such examples - those of France and East 
Germany- are unusual in that they are quantifiable. But one must not overlook the fact that political 
and  social  factors also played  a  role.  Thus  however interesting they may be,  the measures 
mentioned below may not be universally applicable. 
In  France, at the end of the Second World War, a bold new family policy was introduced, based 
mainly on reducing the fall in living standards associated with having children; population growth 
followed; the baby-boom in France was more pronounced and lasted longer than in neighbouring 
countries, and  despite the watering-down of this policy and  its obvious need  for a thorough 
overhaul, France was the country which best resisted the recent trend towards lower birth rates. 
From being the country with the lowest birth rate in Western Europe in the inter-war period, France 
now has one of the highest. 
Up  until 1975,  the birth rates of East and West Germany were virtually the same (the cyclical 
indicator had fallen to around 1.5 in that year). From then on they diverged markedly; since 1978, 
East German women have had an average of 1.8-1.9 children, while the figure for West German 
women has been around 1.3-1.4. Legalized abortion, which was introduced in  East Germany in 
1972, has not been called into question, and modern contraception methods are widely used there. 
The rise in the East German birth rate can be explained by two measures: firstly, the inauguration 
of a "Baby Year" granting a year's leave with almost full pay for the birth of a second or succeeding 
child, and secondly, the introduction of a family housing policy (priority to families with children, 
low-interest loans for owning property or domestic equipment). Such measures are naturally very 
effective in  a country where a particularly high number of women have a job and there is still 
an  acute housing shortage. 
Of course, the long-term effectiveness of this policy will probably not be as great as the present 
birth rate gap might suggest (some of the extra births in recent years in East Germany are due 
to couples having children earlier, rather than having more children). The long-term difference 
between France and the rest of Western Europe over the forty years since the war seems to be 
0.2-0.3 children per woman. It is unrealistic to claim that a democratic state can radically change 
birth rates, but it is also untrue to say that the public authorities can do nothing. They can have 
some, albeit fairly small, influence which may be decisive over the long term and make all the 
difference between having a stable or a declining population. 
It is essential that the cohesion and dynamism of the European Community be developed. There 
must be a sufficient number of young people to fire Europe with their enthusisam and talents. 
The importance of each age group within a harmonious age pyramid has been shown. If the age 
structure is wrong, our old countries, so proud of their past, will become full of old people lacking 
the energy needed to tackle problems before they become insoluble. 
High birth rates in other countries will encourage their young people to emigrate to one or other 
of the EEC Member States. The development of a multiracial society will pose fewer problems, 
and be more positive for all concerned, if the host countries themselves have sufficient numbers 
of young people in their own population. 
Some recommendations 
Despite the relative convergence of demographic trends in the EEC countries, the consequences 
of a continuation of the present very low fertility rates will be felt sooner/later and be more/less 
serious according to the initial shape of the age pyramid. A country such as the Netherlands, 
for instance, where the proportion of young people was relatively high, will be  sheltered from 
the effects of the decline for a few decades yet. The Federal Republic of Germany presents the 
opposite case. The gravity of the national situation and hence the extent to which urgent action 
is called for by the authorities is not identical in all the Member States. 
21 Any policy must be based on a thorough knowledge not only of the demographic facts, but also 
of the aspirations of couples in the reproductive age group. An analysis of such data would seem 
to indicate that families with four or more children are doomed to disappear: in most countries, 
however, given the degree of uncertainty in their choice, a substantial proportion of couples having 
now stopped at the second child could opt for a third if circumstances improved. 
In  all the EEC countries, whatever the level of female employment, the same trend towards an 
increase in paid employment, i.e. outside the home, emerges very clearly. This fundamental change 
is certainly a step in the right direction and probably irreversible. It must underlie any consideration 
of family policy. In the younger generations, few women wish to limit themselves to the role of 
wife and mother. The vast majority want to reconcile two aims which are largely incompatible, 
at least as far as time (and income after the second child) are concerned: to experience the joys 
and emotional rewards of motherhood and, at the same time, to have a professional, social and 
cultural  life outside the home. This conflict is  particularly acute in  the case of a third child, 
especially when the first two are still very young. The different generations must therefore work 
together to make working-hours arrangements less rigid  and  to reduce the workload.  Family 
expenses  must  be  offset  by  financial  transfers,  thus  recognizing  the  social  role  played  by 
individuals  who  take  upon  themselves  the  responsibility  of  raising  and  educating  future 
generations, i.e. who invest in the future and in the long-term well-being of society. In addition, 
the negotiation of more flexible working hours would go some way to reconciling the family and 
professional duties of the father and mother. This would require (a) the retention or extension 
of existing measures, e.g. as regards social security benefits, housing or working conditions, and 
(b) the adoption of specific provisions whereby couples wishing to have a child could do so without 
the quality of their life suffering. Family benefit policies must apply for all children. It must always 
be  socially possible for a child to be  born, regardless of its social status, the socio-economic 
class of the parents or the extent of their resources. A first child, for example, necessarily entails 
significant investments, while a third child and sometimes also a second may force the family 
to find a larger and inevitably more expensive home. One of the parents, and it is often the mother, 
may have to partially or temporarily stop working and  hence do without an  income. 
Whatever measures are taken to boost the birth rate, their benefits must not be cancelled out 
by contrary provisions in other policy sectors (education, employment, income, housing, etc.). 
Hence we  must ensure that the demographic factor is taken  into account when  policies are 
formulated. We must also ensure that the needs of urban children are fully recognized and that 
public  and  private  decision-makers (local  authorities,  employers,  trade  unions,  cultural  and 
religious leaders, etc.) are instilled with a concern for the long-term future. 
Migration policy can play a part in short-term structural adjustments, but is not a solution which 
will  safeguard  the long-term  demographic and  cultural  survival  of Europe.  The  demographic 
imbalance is reaching unprecedented proportions: making good the deficit in Europe would require 
immigration on  a massive scale, unlike anything seen  so far.  But the geographical reservoirs 
capable of remedying these deficits come from cultures increasingly distant from the western 
heritage, hence even greater difficulties of integration. Nor is it certain that such immigration, 
while inevitable to some extent on  account of the population pressure in  the countries of the 
southern hemisphere, will be welcomed by public opinion in the West. History shows that in some 
countries the capacity to absorb immigrants is  greatest when  there  is internal demographic 
dynamism. 
In  short the ESC  makes the following proposals and  recommendations: 
1 )  The demographic factor must be included in the various economic, social and cultural projects 
and debates undertaken at national and Community level. 
The ESC will continue, as always, to express its concern for demographic and family matters, 
for instance in  its Opinions on  the social and economic situation. 
2)  Regular meetings between the ministers responsible for family matters and account to be 
taken of the demographic and family factor by all the Community institutions. To be preceded 
by consultations of family, trade-union and economic organizations. 
22 3)  Financial support for family responsibilities, provided by family benefits and tax concessions, 
should be considered as a right of all parents who are responsible for bringing up a child. 
A first child, for example involves particular outlay which is considerable from the moment 
of birth. A third child, and sometimes even  a second, may sometimes oblige the family to 
find new accommodation. One of the parents and usually the mother, may be forced partially 
or temporarily to withdraw from the labour market with the result that the family's income 
from work is reduced.  Depending on  the age of the children, there will be  changes in  the 
consumption required for their upkeep and education. If measures to offset the financial cost 
of children are to be  fair and effective, they must take account of these facts. 
The costs and responsibilities assumed by parents in  raising and educating a child call for 
financial  compensation  and  the  creation  of a  physical,  social,  psychological  and  moral 
environment in keeping with the responsibilities of the parents and the needs of the children. 
The regulations guiding the allocation of financial aid for family responsibilities were generally 
drawn up  a very long time ago. It is not clear whether these arrangements meet families' 
expectations, either in  terms of demographical effectiveness or equality between families 
or whether they measure up to the kind of solidarity which should exist between families and 
the nation as a whole. Moreover, the methods of financing these measures are not necessarily 
compatible  with  present-day  economic  and  social  conditions  which  have  changed 
considerably since their inception. 
It is therefore imperative that thought be given to the whole question of financial aid towards 
family responsibilities. One  aid  should  be  to simplify bureaucratic structures, which  are 
sometimes complicated for the families concerned and do not enhance the transparency of 
the funds available or the costs. The other aim should be to gauge the effectiveness and impact 
of social support for families, and the way it is financed. 
The goal should be to create a more just system which would promote solidarity and fairness, 
to the benefit of all families and children. 
A study of the socio-economic and geographical distribution of families in terms of numbers 
of children reveals differences which prove that certain arrangements for family financial 
support (amount, form, eligibility criteria) do not permit all potential parents to exercise their 
freedom of choice and do not create genuine equality of rights or opportunities amongst all 
families or children. That  is,  for example,  one  reason  why certain  proposals call  for the 
subsumption of all forms of financial support for family responsibilities under one form of 
benefit. Other proposals would like to see a clear-cut distinction between tax concessions 
and benefits which would, for example, entail rejecting the principle of apportioning benefits 
according to income. Yet others wish to prevent in certain circumstances, the level of family 
benefits/tax concessions rising in  line with the number of children. 
This is a weighty problem which cannot be dealt with briefly in this Report. Any guidelines 
which emerged  from  a debate on  this subject would  have  a definite influence (a) on  the 
birthrate, parenthood being regarded as a right which all families should be  able to enjoy, 
(b) on family policies. 
The  Community  institutions - the  ESC  in  particular - must  be  called  upon  to  tackle  a 
fundamental problem which it would be  neither socially just nor realistic to shirk. 
4)  The creation of a physical environment (town planning, transport, environment, green spaces, 
child-minding facilities, educational, social, sporting, cultural amenities, etc.) and a psycho-
logical and moral environment (less violence in the media and a greater educational effort 
to promote peace through, for instance, international exchanges between  young  people, 
increased participation in development, etc.) which is hospitable to children and young people. 
5)  There  are  numerous  reasons  for  the  decline  in  the  birth  rate,  including  worsening 
unemployment and the fear that it will last. 
23 The ESC has frequently made specific suggestions and demands aimed at helping combat 
unemployment. Such urgent measures, beyond their social and economic objectives, have 
an effect on families and population. Family plans and educational plans need a guarantee 
of real  security. 
6)  As the ESC has already stressed, everything must be done to ensure that the right of all young 
people to a job becomes a reality. 
Providing for young people without a job is a direct burden on the budget of their families, 
made all the more onerous by the fact that these are often low-income families, large families 
and families in  which one of the parents is also unemployed (multiple unemployment is a 
reality). Policies for helping unemployed young people (financial assistance, training, social 
and  psychological support, ... ) and  unemployed parents with dependent children must be 
developed and adjusted. The ESC has already mentioned these points in previous Opinions. 
7)  Everything must be done to enable parents to reconcile their working and family lives better. 
The role of parent has an  educational, social and economic value which must be stressed 
and taken into account, given the services rendered by families. 
8)  The implementation of policies aimed at combating the marginalization of the aged(
3l, who 
are necessary for the balance of society, the care and education of children and keeping 
traditions alive. 
9)  The campaign against infant mortality and complications during pregnancy has achieved some 
positive results. It must be continued, even  if it no longer has a very significant effect on 
population size. Social, economic, cultural and geographical factors still affect the likelihood 
of illness and death. These inequalities must be removed. Such measures are, however, aimed 
more at enhancing human dignity than simply at increasing the population. 
10)  The campaign against sterility must be  stepped up. 
Legislation must be amended to facilitate adoption, e.g. of children from other countries, with 
the aim of giving every child a family and reducing the "differences" connected with their 
origin. 
11)  In  accordance with the debate held  by the Ministers for Social Affairs in  April  1984,  the 
Community  should  study  the  joint  launching  of  a  public  information  campaign  on  the 
demographic situation, its economic and  social consequences and family aid measures. 
12)  Demographic research and  information must be  better funded  at both Member State and 
Community level. 
13)  The  inclusion of demography in  school and  university courses (history, geography, social 
sciences, economics, civics, etc.) is a must. 
Some of the recommended measures will clearly require substantial funding; others will not affect 
costs. If a state and a society are convinced of the long-term benefits of a demographic policy 
they must undertake a firm and lasting political commitment to provide the means to back it up, 
with due respect for individual liberty. The funding of family and demographic policies should 
be based first and foremost on an appeal to national solidarity. At all events family benefits are 
something  to which  the  child  has  a  right  and  must,  as  such,  apply to all  children  without 
discrimination. 
Admittedly, the seriousness of the economic and social situation means that choices have to 
be made. From the demographic point of view priority must be given to the following: child benefits 
must take account (a) of family wishes and interests and (b) of the need to restore balance to 
the age pyramid. The greater the satisfaction experienced by parents at a birth, the more inclined 
they will be to have another child; assistance for housing and the environment; measures enabling 
parents to organize their time better; measures for the vocational training and retraining of young 
people so that the right to work becomes a reality for more people. 
(3)  On  this subject, see the Opinion on  Social Developments in the Community in  1984 (Official Journal C 218  of 29 August 1985). 
24 The debate on future population is a philosophical and political debate. It has a personal aspect. 
It has a social and economic aspect. It is a debate about social policy. 
With this in mind we must effectively promote solidarity in all its aspects. To do this we will have 
to  radically  alter,  firstly  in  cultural  terms,  the  egoistic  attitudes  towards  progress  which 
increasingly characterise our society. 
As  has just been  pointed out, the present economic and  social situation obliges us  to take 
decisions. Priority must be given here to measures for the vocational training and retraining of 
young people, thus helping to safeguard their right to work, which is one of the preconditions 
for their integration into society and the exercise, in due course, of their freedom of choice and 
parental responsibilities. 
25 APPENDIX 
27 Table  1:  General  demographic  data :  population,  births,  deaths,  net  migration,  marriages, 
divorces, 1960 - 1983,  EUR  10 (in  'OOOs) 
Year  Population  Births  Deaths  Natural  Net  Marriages  Divorces 
on  1 Jan.  increase  migration 
1960  239 497  4 319  2 585  1 734  385  1 889  125 
1961  241  615  4 425  2 567  1 858  401  1 919  127 
1962  243 874  4 471  2 682  1 789  1 035  1 933  131 
1963  246 698  4 594  2 756  1 838  132  1 961  136 
1964  248 667  4 704  2 613  2 091  182  1 983  148 
1965  250 940  4 621  2 720  1 901  88  1 975  156 
1966  252 929  4 588  2 719  1 869  - 94  1 959  161 
1967  254 704  4 477  2 722  1 755  -476  1 974  170 
1968  255 983  4 373  2 855  1 518  60  1 951  177 
1969  257 561  4 296  2 892  1 404  431  1 988  194 
1970  259 396  4 136  2 839  1 297  618  2 028  210 
1971  261  311  4 131  2 837  1 294  771  2 029  261 
1972  263 376  3 946  2 872  1 074  519  2 039  332 
1973  264 970  3 762  2 895  867  493  1 978  316 
1974  266 330  3 641  2 864  777  2  1 921  342 
1975  267 109  3 461  2 923  538  .  71  1 882  356 
1976  267 577  3 373  2 921  452  8  1 786  370 
1977  268 036  3 309  2 831  478  113  1 771  350 
1978  268 627  3 298  2 874  424  234  1 716  323 
1979  269 285  3 329  2 860  469  358  1 709  383 
1980  270 112  3 407  2 882  525  383  1 708  419 
1981  271  021  3 360  2 881  479  6  1 657  434 
1982  271  505  3 313  2 862  451  268  1 636  -
1983  272 224  3 207  2 915  292  14  - -
1984  272 530  - - - - - -
Source : Eurostat 
29 Table 2:  Average total population, by country (in  '000),  1960-1983 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK  EUR  10 
1960  9 119  4 581  45684  8 327  2832  50198  314.9  11  487  55433  52 559  240 530 
1970  9638  4 929  50 772  8 793  2 950  53 661  339.8  13 039  60 651  55 522  260 291 
1980  9847  5123  53 714  9643  3 401  56 416  365.1  14150  61  566  56 360  270 585 
1982  9856  5118  54 430  9 790  3 483  56639  365.5  14 313  61  638  56 335  271  968 
1983  9856  5114  54 652  9 848  3 508  56 836  365.8  14 367  61  423  56 377  272 347 
Source : Eurostat 
Table 3:  Life expectancy at  birth (in  years  and  tenths of years)  EUR  10,  1951-1981. 
Year  Men  Women  Difference 
1951  64.0  68.2  4.2 
1961  67.6  73.6  6.0 
1971  68.7  75.1  6.4 
1981  (*)  70.7  78.0  7.3 
(*) Provisional estimate 
Table 4:  Infant mortality rates, 1960- 1983 (as a 0/oo) 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK  EUR  10 
1960  31.2  21.5  27.4  40.1  29.3  43.9  31.5  17.9  33.8  22.5  31.3 
1970  21.1  14.2  18.2  29.6  19.5  29.6  24.9  12.7  23.4  18.5  21.9 
1980  11.0  8.4  10.1  17.9  11.1  14.3  11.5  8.6  12.7  12.1  12.0 
1982  11.7  8.2  9.4  15.1  10.5  13.0  12.1  8.3  10.9  11.0  10.9 
1983  11.2  8.0  8.9  14.6  9.8  12.4  11.2  8.4  10.3  10.2  10.4 
Source : Eurostat 
Table 5:  Annual births (in  '000),  1960- 1983,  EUR  10 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK  EUR  10 
1960  155  76.1  820  157  60.7  910  5.0  239  969  918  4 310 
1964  161  83.4  878  153  64.1  1 016  5.2  251  1 065  1 015  4 692 
1970  142  70.8  850  145  64.4  901  4.4  239  811  904  4132 
1975  120  72.1  745  142  67.2  828  4.0  178  601  698  3 454 
1980  124  57.3  800  148  74.1  644  4.2  181  621  754  3 407 
1982  120  52.7  797  137  70.9  618  4.3  172  621  719  3 313 
1983  117  50.8  749  133  66.8  600  4.2  170  594  721  3 207 
Source: Eurostat 
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Trend  in  number of births, 1960-1982. 
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31 Table 6:  Index of fertility (average number of children per woman), 1960 - 1983,  EUR  10 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK 
1960  2.57  2.54  2.73  2.28  3.75  2.41  2.28  3.11  2.37  2.69 
1964  2.71  2.60  2.90  2.31  4.07  2.70  2.34  3.15  2.55  2.93 
1970  2.20  1.95  2.48  2.34  3.87  2.43  1.97  2.58  2.02  2.44 
1975  1.74  1.92  1.93  2.37  3.39  2.19  1.50  1.67  1.45  1.80 
1980  1.67  1.55  1.97  2.23  3.23  1.66  1.51  1.60  1.44  1.89 
1982  1.60(*  1.43  1.94  - 2.95  1.57  1.49  1.50  1.41  1.75 
1983  - 1.38  1.82(*  - - - 1.45  1.47  1.32 (*  -
(*)  Provisional estimate. 
Sources: Eurostat and  INED. 
Table 7:  Average age at maternity (in years and tenths of years),  1971  - 1982,  EUR  10 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK 
1971  27.05  26.71  27.11  27.39  30.17  28.19  26.99  27.97  26.81  26.67 
1974  26.67  26.58  26.78  26.92  29.76  27.77  27.03  27.37  26.72  26.42 
1977  26.61  26.54  26.52  26.50  29.71  27.50  27.19  27.45  26.82  26.67 
1980  - 26.82  26.81  26.13  29.66  - 27.64  27.69  27.05  26.91 
1982  - 27.14  27.06  - - - - 27.96  27.30  -
Source: INED 
Table 8:  Final number of children of female generations 
Federal 
Generation  England- Denmark  France  Italy  Netherlands  Republic 
Wales  of Germany 
1930  2.32  2.34  2.64  2.24  2.67  2.14 
1940  2.37  2.27  2.41  2.16  2.24  1.97 
1950  2.03  1.87  2.09  - 1.86  1.68 
1954  1.94  1.71  2.03  1.87  1.71  1.55 
Sources:  Festy, P.: La tecondite des pays occidentaux de 1870 a 1970, Travaux et Documents de I'INED, n° 85, INED-PUF, Paris, 1979,300-301. 
Munoz Perez,  F. : L'evolution de  Ia  fecondite dans les pays industrialises depuis 1971, Population, n° 3,  1982,  p.501. 
Table 9:  Proportion of third or higher order births (as a 
0/o). 
Year  Belgium(')  Denmark  France(')  Greece  Ireland  Italy(')  Luxembourg(')  Netherlands  Germany(*)  UK(')  EUR  10 
1960  37.3  36.0  38.8  27.4  60.9  34.8  27.8  41.8  28.2  33.2  34.4 
1970  29.2  22.2  29.9  20.5  51.3  30.2  25.9  27.5  26.3  28.8  28.7 
1980  19.2  17.1  21.2  17.7  46.6  - 15.9  19.8  17.0  22.2  21.0 
1982  - 16.6  23.1  - 46.9  - 15.2  21.0  16.2  23.0  -
1983  - 16.6  - - - - 15.6  20.6  - - -
Source : Eurostat 
(*)Children born to marriages only. 
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Index of fertility, 1960-1982. 
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33 Table  10:  Index of first marriages 
Federal 
Year  England- Denmark  France  Italy  Republic 
Wales  of Germany 
1965  1.006  0.970  0.993  - 1.102 
1970  1.047  0.811  0.919  - 0.974 
1975  0.882  0.663  0.858  0.931  0.764 
1980  0.772  0.532  0.713  0.765  0.656 
1982  - 0.480  0.658  - 0.619 (*) 
(*)  provisional. 
Source: INED,  Projet international d'analyse demographique conjoncturelle. 
Table  11:  Average age at first marriage, women (in years and tenths of years),  EUR  10 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK 
1960  23.4  22.9  23.5  24.4  26.0  24.8  - 24.5  23.7  23.3 
1970  22.4  22.9  22.4  22.9  24.3  24.1  23.2  22.9  23.0  22.4 
1980  23.0  24.8  23.0  22.3  24.1  24.1  23.0  23.2  23.4  23.0 
1982  - 25.4  23.4  - - - 23.0  23.5  23.8  -
1983  - 25.8  - - - - - 23.7  - -
Source : Eurostat 
Table  12:  Proportion of women married by 50 (as a  0/o) 
Federal 
Generation  England- Denmark  France  Republic 
Wales  of Germany 
1940  96.9  93.2  92.8  94.3 
1945  99.2  91.1  91.9  92.9 
1950  94.9  85.7  89.6  87.3 
1955  89.1  70.7  84.2  79.2 
1960  74.9  52.6  73.0  67.4 
Source: INED, Projet international d'analyse demographique conjoncturelle. 
Table  13:  Proportion of births outside marriage (as a  0/o),  1960 - 1982,  EUR  10 
Year  Belgium  Denmark  France  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands  Germany  UK  EUR  10 
1960  2.1  7.8  6.1  1.2  1.6  2.4  3.2  1.4  6.3  5.2  4.5 
1970  2.8  11.0  6.8  1.1  2.7  2.2  4.0  2.1  5.5  8.0  5.2 
1980  4.1  33.0  11.4  1.5  5.0  4.1  6.0  4.1  7.6  11.5  7.6 
1982  4.9  38.3  13.2  1.7  6.1  4.6  6.2  5.9  8.5  14.1  10.2 
Source : Eurostat 
Table  14:  Index of divorces (sum of divorce rates by duration of marriage: proportion of marriages 
ending in divorce - as a  0/o) 
Federal 
Year  England- Belgium  Denmark  France  Netherlands  Republic 
Wales  of Germany 
1965  10.7  8.2  18.2  10.7  7.2  12.2 
1970  16.3  9.6  25.1  12.0  11.0  15.9 
1975  32.2  16.1  36.7  17.2  20.0  21.0 
1980  39.3  20.9  39.3  24.7  25.7  22.7 
Source: INED, Projet international d'analyse demographique conjoncturelle. 
34 Table  15:  TOTAL POPULATION  Trend 1960- 1985 and projections 1985- 2025. 
EEC  10 - total population in millions 
Year  "low" hypothesis*  "high" hypothesis** 
1960  240.6 
1985  269.9  270.7 
2000  267.4  274.6 
2025  241.5  268.5 
*  continuation of present fertility rate 
**  gradual  rise  in  fertility rate from  about 1990,  up  to about generation 
replacement level (gross reproduction rate equal to 1 around 2020) 
Source:  United Nations: World population prospects as assessed in  1980, 
New York,  1981 
In both cases the population varies little between now and the end of the century; in the 'low"hypothesis 
it falls lightly, while in the "high" hypothesis it continues to grow, albeit very slowly. The divergence 
widens after that : by 2025 it will have fallen back to slightly above its present level (around 270 million) 
according to the "high" hypothesis; according to the "low" hypothesis it will have fallen by 10°/o  and 
be  equal to its 1960 level (around 240 million). 
Taking an  even  longer horizon, the following results would be  obtained for Germany and France: 
Table  16: 
Year 
1950 
1985 
2000 
2025 
2050 
2100 
Sources: 
TOTAL POPULATION  Trend  1950- 1985 and projections 1985- 2100, 
Federal Republic of Germany and  France, total 
population in  millions 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  I  FRANCE 
FERTILITY (Average number of children per woman) 
1.2  1.5  1.87  2.25  1.5  1.8  2.1  2.4 
50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  41.6  41.6  41.6  41.6 
59.6  60.0  60.5  61.0  54.0  54.4  54.8  55.1 
55.0  57.0  59.5  62.0  54.0  56.0  58.2  60.2 
42.0  46.7  53.3  60.6  48.7  54.6  61.6  68.6 
27.5  34.6  45.6  59.4  37.9  48.6  62.1  77.3 
....  ....  .  ...  .  ...  20.2  ....  .  ...  101.1 
- Modellrechnungen zur langfristigen natiirllchen Bevolkungsentwicklung in Bund und Liindern, 1978 
-I  NED: La situation demographique de Ia France, Rapport au Conseil central de planification, Paris, 1979 
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Age distribution of EEC  population on  1 January 1985 
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France. Age pyramid  in  1975, 2000,  2025  and 2050 according to long-term 
fertility rate (1.5;  1.8;  2.1  or 2.4  children per woman). 
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37 Table 17:  POPULATION  OF  THE  COMMUNITY  AND  AFRICA:  TREND  1950-1985:  OUTLOOK, 
1985-2025 ('000,000) 
1950  1985  2000  2025 
EAST AFRICA  61.5  155.8  250.0  477.9 
NORTH  AFRICA  52.1  125.8  186.2  295.9 
AFRICA  220.3  546.2  852.9  1,541.7(*) 
EEC- 10  222.9  270.7  274.6  268.5 
Ratio AFRICA/EEC-10  0.99  2.02  3.11  5.74 
EEC  SHARE {0/o)  OF WORLD  POPULATION  8.8°/o  5.6°/o  4.5°/o  3.3°/o 
(*)  These forecasts should be considered, although the serious effects of the disastrous famines now taking place, and 
which could spread, should not be  overlooked. 
The pattern is striking. In 1950 the population of Africa and the EEC, (i.e. the present ten Member States) 
was similar. Today, Africa has twice as many inhabitants; in forty years' time it may well have 1,500 
million, i.e.  six times as many. 
A number of African countries which are currently considered small or medium-sized will exceed the 
present populations (55-60  million) of the biggest EEC countries - Federal Germany, France and the 
United  Kingdom.  These  African  countries  include  the  Sudan  (55  million),  Algeria  and  Morocco 
(60  million) and Egypt (95  million). 
The abrupt and massive changes in world population geography resulting from the demographic trends 
of the next few decades will lead to a repatterning of world political geography whose general outline 
can already be foreseen. Young powers will emerge, basing their strength in large part on population 
growth and the stimulus it creates; old powers could fade. 
38 SOME DEFINITIONS(4) 
Ageing: increase in the proportion of old people in the population. The term "demographic ageing" 
is often used to distinguish it from individual ageing, a biological phenomenon. 
Birth rate: ratio of number of births to average population for the year. 
Cohort: a group of individuals having a statistical factor in common. 
Death rate: ratio of number of deaths to average population for the year. 
Demographic transition: process whereby a society moves from a regime in which high fertility 
and mortality are more or less in balance to a regime where low fertility and mortality are also 
more or less in balance. 
Fertility: ratio of birth rate to total number of women of reproductive age. 
Fertility rate: ratio between the number of births to women of a given age and the total number 
of women of the same age. 
Final number of children: average number of live-born children at the end  of period of female 
fertility, in  the absence of death. This average number is often calculated in generations. 
Generation: total number of persons born in a given civil year. (This meaning is different from 
current usage where it refers loosely to the interval of time separating the birth of parents from 
that of their children). 
Household: all the persons inhabiting the same unit of accommodation; can be just one person. 
(This meaning is different from current usage where it tends to refer to couples). 
Life  expectancy at age  x: average  number of years  left to live  for persons aged  x years,  in 
accordance with the mortality rates described in the life tables. In particular, life expectancy at 
birth is the average duration of the life of individuals subject from birth to the mortality rate in 
the tables; also known as average life. 
Life table mortality rate: table describing, according to an  age scale, the likelihood of death in 
a generation. Reference is usually to current life tables, measured over a year or several years. 
It contains a series of "mortality quotas", i.e. the percentages, for each given age and sex group, 
of persons dying in the year, and all the tables derived from this series: survival table, death table, 
life expectancy tables. 
Marriage rate: ratio of number of marriages to average population for the year. 
Medium-term index of births (or reduced births total): average number of children borne by a female 
generation subject for their whole life to the fertility rates per age of the observation period, in 
the absence of death. It is obtained by adding up the fertility rates per age from 15 to 49 years. 
With the present death rate, a medium-term index of births of 2.1  children per woman is required 
for generation replacement. 
Natural increase: the difference over a given period between the number of births and the number 
of deaths. 
(4)  Published by the review "Population et avenir" and based on  a brochure prepared, with the aid of INED, by the French Ministry 
for Social Affairs under the title: "La France et Ia population". 
39 Natural increase rate: ratio of natural increase to average population for the year. Generally 
expressed as a 
0/o  per annum. It is the difference between the birth and death rates, which are 
generally expressed per 1,000 inhabitants and  per annum. 
Net  migration: difference,  for  a  country  or  administrative  district,  between  the  number  of 
immigrants and emigrants. The balance is positive if immigration exceeds emigration. 
Replacement of generations: level of fertility such that net reproduction equals 100°/o. The number 
of girls in the children's generation is therefore equal to the number of women in  the parents' 
generation, taking the mortality rates into account. 
Reproduction: way in which children's generations replace parents', frequently measured by the 
ratio between the number of girls in the children's generation and the number of women in the 
parents' generation; the gross reproduction rate is an index of fertility, the net reproduction rate 
takes account of deaths up to child-bearing age. 
Sex ratio: ratio at birth, or at a given age,  of males to females. 
Small age groups: the "small age groups" are those generations born in periods when the birth 
rate is temporarily substantially lower. 
Total  increase: the difference over a given  period  between the size of the population on  two 
different dates. The total increase is the sum of the natural increase and net migration. 
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